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THE GROUP AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

The *leitmotiv* of sociological theory and research is "individual, group, and their mutual dependence." Since functional sociology includes not merely the emotional and the biological aspects of mental processes but also man's biological reality, the bodily needs, the environmental influences, and the cultural reactions to them must be studied side by side. Not only does the individual depend upon the group in whatever he achieves, but the group in all its individual members depends upon the development of a material outfit which, in its essence, is an addition to the human anatomy and which entails corresponding modifications of human physiology. The relation is not of the individual to society or the group but to a plurality of groups. Analysis of a society into aspects and into institutions must be carried out simultaneously if a complete understanding of that society is desired. The analysis of such aspects as economics, education or social control, and political organization defines the type and level of the characteristic activities in a culture, discloses the totality of motives, interests, and values of the individual, and gives insight into the whole process by which the individual is conditioned or culturally formed, and of the group mechanism of this process. The analysis into institutions gives the concrete picture of the social organization within the culture. The twofold approach through the study of the individual with his innate tendencies and their cultural transformation and the study of the group as the relation and co-ordination of individuals with reference to space, environment, and material equipment is necessary. Symbolism, which is in essence that modification of the human organism which allows it to transform the physiological drive into a cultural value, must make its appearance with the earliest appearance of human culture. Symbols are necessary for communication, for the incorporation of an effective element into a culture, for its transmission, and for the recognition of its value.

I. PERSONALITY, ORGANIZATION, AND CULTURE

It might seem axiomatic that in any sociological approach the individual, the group, and their relations must remain the constant theme of all observations and argument. The group, after all, is but the assemblage of individuals and must be thus defined—unless we fall into the fallacy of "group mind," "collective sensorium," or the gigantic "Moral Being" which thinks out and improvises all collective events. Nor can such conceptions as individual, personality, self, or mind be described except in terms of membership in a group or groups—unless again we wish to hug the figment of the individual as a detached, self-contained entity. We can, therefore, lay down as an axiom—or better, as an empirical truth—that in field work and theory, in observation and analysis, the *leitmotiv* "individual, group, and their mutual dependence" will run through all the inquiries.

But the exact determination of what we mean by "individual," or how he is related to his "group," the final understanding of the terms "social organization" or "cultural determinism" presents a number of problems to be discussed. I would like to add that over and above individual mental processes and forms of social organization it is necessary to introduce another factor, which together with the previous ones makes up the totality of cultural processes and phenomena. I mean the material apparatus which is indispensable both for the understanding of how a culturally determined individual comes into being and, also, how he co-operates in group life with other individuals.

In what follows I shall discuss some of these questions from the anthropological point of view. Most of my scientific experiences in culture are derived from work in the field. As an anthropologist I am interested in primitive as well as in developed cultures. The functional approach, moreover, considers the totality of cultural phenomena as the necessary background both of the analysis of man and that of society. Indeed, since in my opinion the relation between individual and group is a universal motive in all problems of sociology and comparative anthropology, a brief survey of the functional theory of culture, with a special emphasis on our specific problem, will be the best method of presentation.

Functionalism differs from other sociological theories more definitely, perhaps, in its conception and definition of the individual than in any other respect.¹ The functionalist includes in his analysis not merely the emotional as well as the intellectual side of mental processes, but also insists that man in his full biological reality has

¹ When I speak of "functionalism" here I mean the brand which I have produced and am cultivating myself. My friend, Professor R. H. Lowie of Berkeley, has in his last book, *The History of Ethnological Theory* (1937), introduced the distinction between "pure" and "tempered" functionalism—my brand being the pure one. Usually Professor Radcliffe-Brown's name is linked with mine as a representative of the functional school. Here the distinction between "plain" and "hyphenated" functionalism might be introduced. Professor Lowie has, in my opinion, completely misunderstood the essence of "pure" functionalism. The substance of this article may serve as a corrective. Professor Radcliffe-Brown is, as far as I can see, still developing and deepening the views of the French sociological school. He thus has to neglect the individual and disregard biology. In this article functionalism "plain and pure" will be briefly outlined with special reference to the problem of the group and the individual.

to be drawn into our analysis of culture. The bodily needs and environmental influences, and the cultural reactions to them, have thus to be studied side by side.

The field worker observes human beings acting within an environmental setting, natural and artificial; influenced by it, and in turn transforming it in co-operation with each other. He studies how men and women are motivated in their mutual relations by feelings of attraction and repulsion, by co-operative duties and privileges, by profits drawn and sacrifices made. The invisible network of social bonds, of which the organization of the group is made up, is defined by charters and codes—technological, legal, customary, and moral—to which every individual is differentially submitted, and which integrate the group into a whole. Since all rules and all tribal tradition are expressions in words—that is, symbols—the understanding of social organization implies an analysis of symbolism and language. Empirically speaking the field worker has to collect texts, statements, and opinions, side by side with the observation of behavior and the study of material culture.

In this brief preamble we have already insisted that the individual must be studied as a biological reality. We have indicated that the physical world must be part of our analysis, both as the natural milieu and as the body of tools and commodities produced by man. We have pointed out that individuals never cope with, or move within, their environment in isolation, but in organized groups, and that organization is expressed in traditional charters, which are symbolic in essence.

II. THE INDIVIDUAL ORGANISM UNDER CONDITIONS OF CULTURE

Taking man as a biological entity it is clear that certain minima of conditions can be laid down which are indispensable to the personal welfare of the individual and to the continuation of the group. All human beings have to be nourished, they have to reproduce, and they require the maintenance of certain physical conditions: ventilation, temperature within a definite range, a sheltered and dry place to rest, and safety from the hostile forces of nature, of animals, and of man. The physiological working of each individual

organism implies the intake of food and of oxygen, occasional movement, and relaxation in sleep and recreation. The process of growth in man necessitates protection and guidance in its early stages and, later on, specific training.

We have listed here some of the essential conditions to which cultural activity, whether individual or collective, has instrumentally to conform. It is well to recall that these are only minimum conditions—the very manner in which they are satisfied in culture imposes certain additional requirements. These constitute new needs, which in turn have to be satisfied. The primary—that is, the biological—wants of the human organism are not satisfied naturally by direct contact of the individual organism with the physical environment. Not only does the individual depend on the group in whatever he achieves and whatever he obtains, but the group and all its individual members depend on the development of a material outfit, which in its essence is an addition to the human anatomy, and which entails corresponding modifications of human physiology.

In order to present our argument in a synoptic manner, let us concisely list in Column A of the table on page 942 the basic needs of the individual. Thus “Nutrition (metabolism)” indicates not only the need for a supply of food and of oxygen, but also the conditions under which food can be prepared, eaten, digested, and the sanitary arrangements which this implies. “Reproduction” obviously means that the sexual urges of man and woman have to be satisfied, and the continuity of the group maintained. The entry “Bodily comforts” indicates that the human organism can be active and effective only within certain ranges of temperature; that it must be sheltered from dampness and drafts; that it must be given opportunities for rest and sleep. “Safety” again refers to all the dangers lurking in the natural environment, both for civilized and primitive: earthquakes and tidal waves, snowstorms and excessive insolation; it also indicates the need of protection from dangerous animals and human foes. “Relaxation” implies the need of the human organism for a rhythm of work by day and sleep at night, of intensive bodily exercise and rest, of seasons of recreation alternating with periods of practical activity. The entry “Movement” declares that human beings must have regular exercise of muscles and nervous system.

“Growth” indicates the fact that the development of the human organism is culturally directed and redefined from infancy into ripe age.

SYNOPTIC SURVEY OF BIOLOGICAL AND DERIVED NEEDS
AND THEIR SATISFACTION IN CULTURE

A	B	C	D	E	F
Basic Needs (Individual)	Direct Responses (Organized, i.e., Collective)	Instrumental Needs	Responses to Instru- mental Needs	Symbolic and Integrative Needs	Systems of Thought and Faith
Nutrition (metabolism).....	Commissariat	Renewal of cultural apparatus	Econom- ics	Transmission of experience by means of precise, con- sistent prin- ciples	Knowl- edge
Reproduction...	Marriage and family	Charters of behavior and their sanctions	Social control	Means of in- tellectual, emotional, and prag- matic con- trol of des- tiny and chance	Magic Religion
Bodily comforts.	Domicile and dress				
Safety.....	Protection and de- fense				
Relaxation.....	Systems of play and repose	Renewal of personnel	Educa- tion		
Movement.....	Set activities and sys- tems of communi- cation				
Growth.....	Training and apprentice- ship	Organization of force and com- pulsion	Political organi- zation	Communal rhythm of recreation, exercise, and rest	Art Sports Games Ceremo- nial

It is clear that the understanding of any one of these entries of Column A brings us down immediately to the analysis of the individual organism. We see that any lack of satisfaction in any one of the basic needs must necessarily imply at least temporary malad-

justment. In more pronounced forms, nonsatisfaction entails ill-health and decay through malnutrition, exposure to heat or cold, to sun or moisture; or destruction by natural forces, animals, or man. Psychologically the basic needs are expressed in drives, desires, or emotions, which move the organism to the satisfaction of each need through systems or linked reflexes.

The science of culture, however, is concerned not with the raw material of anatomical and physiological endowment in the individual, but with the manner in which this endowment is modified by social influences. When we inquire how the bodily needs are satisfied under conditions of culture, we find the systems of direct response to bodily needs which are listed in Column B. And here we can see at once the complete dependence of the individual upon the group: each of these cultural responses is dependent upon organized collective activities, which are carried on according to a traditional scheme, and in which human beings not merely co-operate with one another but continue the achievements, inventions, devices, and theories inherited from previous generations.

In matters of nutrition, the individual human being does not act in isolation; nor does he behave in terms of mere anatomy and unadulterated physiology; we have to deal, instead, with personality, culturally molded. Appetite or even hunger is determined by the social milieu. Nowhere and never will man, however primitive, feed on the fruits of his environment. He always selects and rejects, produces and prepares. He does not depend on the physiological rhythm of hunger and satiety alone; his digestive processes are timed and trained by the daily routine of his tribe, nation, or class. He eats at definite times, and he goes for his food to his table. The table is supplied from the kitchen, the kitchen from the larder, and this again is replenished from the market or from the tribal food-supply system.

The symbolic expressions here used—"table," "kitchen," etc.—refer to the various phases of the process which separates the requirements of the organism from the natural sources of food supply, and which is listed in Column B as "Commissariat." They indicate that at each stage man depends on the group—family, club, or fraternity. And here again we use these expressions in a sense em-

bracing primitive as well as civilized institutions, concerned with the production, preparation, and consumption of nourishment. The raw material of individual physiology is found everywhere refashioned by cultural and social determinism. The group has molded the individual in matters of taste, of tribal taboos, of the nutritive and symbolic value of food, as well as in the manners and modes of commensalism. Above all, the group, through economic co-operation, provides the stream of food supply.

One general point which we will have to make throughout our analysis is that the relation is not of the individual to society or *the* group. Even in matters of commissariat a number of groups make their appearance. In the most primitive society we would have the organization of food-gatherers, some institutions through which the distribution and apportionment of food takes place, and the commensal group of consumers—as a rule, the family. And were we to analyze each of these groups from the point of view of nutrition, we would find that the place of the individual in each of them is determined by the differentiation as to skill, ability, interest, and appetite.

When we come to the cultural satisfaction of the individual impulses and emotions of sex and of the collective need for reproduction, we would see that human beings do not reproduce by nature alone. The full satisfaction of the impulse, as well as the socially legitimate effect of it, is subject to a whole set of rules defining courtship and marriage, prenuptial and extra-connubial intercourse, as well as the life within the family (Col. B, "Marriage and family"). The individual brings to this, obviously, his or her anatomical equipment, and the corresponding physiological impulses. He also contributes the capacity to develop tastes and interests, emotional attitudes and sentiments. Yet in all this the group not only imposes barriers and presents opportunities, suggests ideals and restrictions, and dictates values, but the community as a whole, through its system of legal rules, ethical and religious principles, and such concepts as honor, virtue, and sin, affects even the physiological attitude of man to woman. Take the most elementary physical impulse, such as the attraction of one sex by another. The very estimate of beauty and the appreciation of the bodily shape

is modified by traditional reshaping: lip plugs and nose sticks, scarification and tattooing, the deformation of feet, breasts, waist, and head, and even of the organs of reproduction. In courtship and in selection for marriage such factors as rank, wealth, and economic efficiency enter into the estimate of the integral desirability and value of one mate for the other. And again the fullest expression of the impulse in the desire for children is affected by the systems of legal principle, economic interest, and religious ideology, which profoundly modify the innate substratum of human physiology.

Enough has been said to point out that here once more any empirical study of the reproductive process in a given culture must consider both the individual, the group, and the material apparatus of culture. The individual, in this most personal and subjective concern of human life, is submitted to the influence of tradition which penetrates right down to the processes of internal secretion and physiological response. The selective business of choice and of mating are constantly directed and influenced by the social setting. The most important stages (i.e., marriage and parenthood) have to receive a social hallmark in the contract of marriage. The legitimacy of the fruits of their bodily union depends upon whether they have conformed or not to the systems evolved in the community by traditional dictates.

Yet here once more we do not deal with the group and the individual, but we would have to consider a whole set of human agglomerations: the group of the two principal actors (i.e., marriage), the prospective family, the already developed families of each mate, the local community, and the tribe as the bearer of law, tradition, and their enforcement.

We must survey the other items of Column B more rapidly. The whole cultural system which corresponds to the necessity of keeping the human organism within certain limits of temperature, to the necessity of protecting it from the various inclemencies of wind and weather, obviously implies also the parallel consideration of individual and group. In constructing and maintaining even the simplest habitation, in the keeping of the fire alive, in the upkeep of roads and communications, the individual alone is not enough. He

has to be trained for each task in technological and co-operative abilities, and he has to work in conjunction with others.

From the biological point of view the group acts as an indispensable medium for the realization of individual bodily needs. The organism within each culture is trained to accommodate and harden to certain conditions which might prove dangerous or even fatal without this training.

Here, therefore, we have again the two elements: the molding or conditioning of the human anatomy and physiology by collective influences and cultural apparatus, and the production of this apparatus through co-operative activities. Safety is achieved by organized defense, precautionary measures, and calculations based on tribal knowledge and foresight.

The development of the muscular system and the provision of movement are again provided for by the training of the individual organism and by the collective production of means of communication, of vehicles of transport, and of technical rules which define their use. The physical growth as guided by the influence of the group on the individual shows directly the dependence of the organism upon his social milieu. It is also a contribution of the individual to the community in that it supplies in each case an adequate member of one or several social units.

III. THE INSTRUMENTAL IMPERATIVES OF CULTURE

In glancing at our chart and comparing Columns A and B, we recognize that the first represents the biological needs of the individual organism which must be satisfied in every culture. Column B describes briefly the cultural responses to each of these needs. Culture thus appears first and foremost as a vast instrumental reality—the body of implements and commodities, charters of social organization, ideas and customs, beliefs and values—all of which allow man to satisfy his biological requirements through co-operation and within an environment refashioned and readjusted. The human organism, however, itself becomes modified in the process and readjusted to the type of situation provided by culture. In this sense culture is also a vast conditioning apparatus, which through training, the imparting of skills, the teaching of morals, and the develop-

ment of tastes amalgamates the raw material of human physiology and anatomy with external elements, and through this supplements the bodily equipment and conditions the physiological processes. Culture thus produces individuals whose behavior cannot be understood by the study of anatomy and physiology alone, but has to be studied through the analysis of cultural determinism—that is, the processes of conditioning and molding. At the same time we see that from the very outset the existence of groups—that is, of individuals organized for co-operation and cultural give and take—is made indispensable by culture.

But this first approach still remains chaotic and incomplete. On the one hand it is easy to see that certain fundamental types of human grouping, such as family, village community, the politically organized tribe, or the modern state, appear almost everywhere in Column B. The family is not merely the reproductive group, it is also almost invariably a unit playing the more or less dominant part in the commissariat. It is associated with the domicile and often with the production of clothing and other means of bodily protection (Col. B, “Domicile and dress”). The tribe or state which is primarily associated with protection and defense is also the group which takes cognizance of marriage law and family organization, which has its collective financial systems, and which at times organizes nutritive exploits on a large scale. Nor could we eliminate the role of the village community from any of the items listed in Column B, for this also functions at times as a food-producing group, or at least plays some part in the commissariat. It is an assemblage of households or tents providing the social setting for courtship and communal recreations. Thus a further analysis of the integrated responses listed in Column B appears inevitable from the point of view of the organization into concrete units of collective activity—that is, institutions.

Our list is also incomplete in so far as certain institutions have not yet been listed. The church, for instance, to which in primitive communities there may correspond a totemic clan or a kinship group worshipping a common ancestor, is not yet on the map. Institutions corresponding to rank and hierarchy, to occupation, and to free association into groups, secret societies, and charitable in-

surance groups, have not yet been connected with any part of our argument.

Another element of confusion becomes apparent were we to cut short our analysis at this stage: for certain types of activities—economic, educational, or normative—run right through every one of the cultural responses of Column B.

Our further analysis thus branches off into a double line of argument. We can, on the one hand, consider the organization of human activities into certain concrete and, as we shall see, universal forms such as the family, the clan, the tribe, the age-grade, the association (club, secret society), the occupational group (professional or economic), or the church, and the status group or hierarchy in rank, wealth, or power. We have designated such organized groups, connected with definite purposeful activities and invariably united by special reference to environment and to the material apparatus which they wield, by the term "institution."

On the other hand, we can concentrate on the type and character of the activity and define more fully the several aspects of culture, such as economics, education, social control, knowledge, magic, and religion.

Let us start with a brief analysis of this second point. Man's anatomical endowment—which obviously includes not only his muscular system and his organs of digestion and reproduction, but also his brain—is an asset which will be developed under any system of culture when the individual is trained into a full tribesman or citizen of his community. The natural endowment of man presents also, we have seen, a system of needs which are, under culture, satisfied by organized and instrumentally adjusted responses. The empirical corollary to our analysis of basic needs has been that, under conditions of culture, the satisfaction of every organic need is achieved in an indirect, complicated, roundabout manner. It is this vast instrumentalism of human culture which has allowed man to master the environment in a manner incomparably more effective than any animal adaptation.

But every achievement and advantage demands its price to be paid. The complex cultural satisfaction of the primary biological needs imposes upon man new secondary or derived imperatives. In

Column C of our table we have briefly listed these new imperatives. It is clear that the use of tools and implements, and the fact that man uses and destroys in the use—that is, consumes—such goods as food produced and prepared, clothing, building materials, and means of transportation, implies the necessity of a constant “renewal of the cultural apparatus.”

Every cultural activity again is carried through co-operation. This means that man has to obey rules of conduct: life in common, which is essential to co-operation, means sacrifices and joint effort, the harnessing of individual contributions and work to a common end, and the distribution of the results according to traditional claims. Life in close co-operation—that is, propinquity—offers temptations as regards sex and property. Co-operation implies leadership, authority, and hierarchy, and these, primitive or civilized, introduce the strain of competitive vanity and rivalries in ambition. The rules of conduct which define duty and privilege, harness concupiscences and jealousies, and lay down the charter of family, municipality, tribe, and of every co-operative group, must therefore not only be known in every society, but they must be sanctioned—that is, provided with means of effective enforcement. Thus the need for code and for effective sanction is another derived imperative imposed on every organized group (“Charters of behavior and their sanctions,” Col. C).

The members of such groups have to be renewed even as the material objects have to be replaced. Education in the widest sense—that is, the development of the infant into a fully fledged member of his group—is a type of activity which must exist in every culture and which must be carried out specifically with reference to every type of organization (“The renewal of personnel,” Col. C). The need for “Organization of force and compulsion” (Col. C) is universal.

In Column D we find briefly listed the cultural systems to be found in every human group as a response to the instrumental needs imposed by the roundabout type of cultural satisfactions. Thus “Economics,” that is, systems of production, of distribution, and of consumption; organized systems of “Social control”; “Education,” that is, traditional means by which the individual is brought up from

infancy to tribal or national status; and "Political organization" into municipality, tribe, or state are universal aspects of every human society (cf. Col. D).

Let us look at our argument and at our table from the point of view of anthropological field work or that of a sociological student in a modern community—that is, from the angle of empirical observation. Our table indicates that field research on primitive or developed communities will have to be directed upon such aspects of culture as economics, legal institutions, education, and the political organization of the unit. Our inquiries will have to include a specific study of the individual, as well as of the group within which he has to live and work.

It is clear that in economic matters the individual member of a culture must acquire the necessary skills, learn how to work and produce, appreciate the prevalent values, manage his wealth, and regulate his consumption according to the established standard of living. Among primitive peoples there will be in all this a considerable uniformity as regards all individuals. In highly civilized communities, the differentiation of labor and of functions defines the place and the productive value of the individual in society. On the other hand, the collective aspect—that is, the organization of economics—is obviously one of the main factors in defining the level of culture and in determining a great many factors of social structure, hierarchy, rank, and status.

As regards social control, anthropological field work in primitive communities has in my opinion missed two essential points. First of all, the absence of clearly crystallized legal institutions does not mean that mechanisms of enforcement, effective sanctions, and at times complicated systems by which obligations and rights are determined are absent. Codes, systems of litigation, and effective sanctions are invariably to be found as a by-product of the action and reaction between individuals within every organized group—that is, institution. The legal aspect is thus in primitive societies a by-product of the influence of organization upon individual psychology.

On the other hand, the study of the legal problem from the individual point of view reveals to us that the submission to tribal order

is always a matter of long and effective training. In many primitive communities, the respect for the rule and the command is not inculcated very early in life—that is, parental authority is, as a rule, less rigidly and drastically forced upon children among so-called savages than among civilized peoples. At the same time there are certain tribal taboos, rules of personal decency, and of domestic morality that are impressed not so much by direct castigation as by the strong shock of ostracism and personal indignation which the child receives from parents, siblings, and contemporaries. In many communities we find that the child passes through a period of almost complete detachment from home, running around, playing about, and engaging in early activities with his playmates and contemporaries. In such activities strict teaching in tribal law is enforced more directly and poignantly than in the parental home. The fact remains that in every community the human being grows up into a law-abiding member; and he is acquainted with the tribal code; and that, through the variety of educational influences and considerations of self-interest, reasonable give and take, and balance of sacrifices and advantages, he follows the rulings of his traditional system of laws. Thus the study of how obedience to rules is inculcated in the individual during his life-history and the study of the mutualities of give and take within organized life in institutions constitute the full field for observation and analysis of the legal system in a primitive community. I would like to add that the science of modern jurisprudence could become inspired by anthropology in treating legal phenomena within the context of social life and in conjunction with other norms of conduct.

As regards education, we need only point out that this is the very process through which the total conditioning of the individual is accomplished, and that this always takes place within the organized groups into which the individual enters. He is born into the family, which almost invariably supplies his earliest and most important schooling in the earliest exercise of bodily functions, in the learning of language, and in the acquisition of the simplest manners of cleanliness, conduct, and polite behavior. He then may, through a system of initiation, enter into a group of adolescents, of young warriors, and then of mature tribesmen. In every one of his technical and

economic activities he passes through an apprenticeship in which he acquires the skills as well as the legal code of privilege and obligation of his group.

IV. THE PLACE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN ORGANIZED GROUPS

So far we have been speaking of the instrumental aspects of culture. Their definition is essentially functional. Since in every community there is the need for the renewal of the material apparatus of tools and implements and the production of goods of consumption, there must exist organized economics at every level of development. All the influences which transform the naked infant into a cultural personality have to be studied and recorded as educational agencies and constitute the aspect which we label "education." Since law and order have to be maintained, there must be a code of rules, a means of their readjustment and re-establishment when broken or infringed. In every community there exists, therefore, a juridical system. This functional approach is based on the empirical summing-up of the theory of derived needs and their relation to individual biology and cultural co-operation alike.

What is the relation between these functional aspects of culture and the organized forms of activities which we have called "institutions"? The aspects define the type of activity; at the same time every one of them is carried out by definite groups. Co-operation implies spatial contiguity. Two human beings of different sex who are engaged in the business of reproduction, and who have to rear, train, and provide for their offspring cannot be separated by a great distance in space. The members of the family are subject to the requirement of physical contiguity in the narrow sense. They form a household, and, since the household needs food, implies shelter, and the whole apparatus of domestic supply, it must not only be a reproductive but also an economic as well as an educational group united by the physical framework of habitation, utensils, and joint wealth.

Thus we find that one of the universal institutions of mankind, the family, is not merely a group of people thrown together into a common nook and shelter of the environment, wielding conjointly the definite apparatus of domicile, of material equipment, and a portion of productive territory, but also bound by a charter of rules de-

fining their mutual relations, their activities, their rights, and their privileges. The charter of the family, moreover, invariably defines the position of the offspring by reference to the marriage contract of the parents. All the rules of legitimacy, of descent, of inheritance, and succession are contained in it.

The territorial principle of integration produces yet another group: the village community, municipal unit, horde, or territorial section. People unite into villages or migratory hordes, roaming together over a joint territory—partly because there are many tasks for which the workers have to unite; partly because they are the natural groups for immediate defense against animals and marauders; partly also because daily contact and co-operation develop the secondary bonds of acquaintance and affection. And here also, apart from the territorial unity with its rules of land tenure, corporate or individual, apart from the joint ownership of certain instruments such as communal buildings, apart from the permanent personnel of which such a group consists, we have also mythological, legal, and legendary charters from which the sentiments that enter into the bonds of membership are largely derived.

Another institution determined by the spatial principle and united through it on a variety of functions is the widest territorial group, the tribe. This unit as a rule is organized on the joint wielding of collective defense and aggression. It presents, even in the most primitive forms, a differentiation and hierarchy in administrative matters, in ceremonial proceedings, and in military or legal leadership.

In many parts of the world political organization on the territorial basis and cultural identity have to be distinguished. We have in our modern world the minority problem; in primitive communities the symbiosis of two races or two culturally different communities under the same political regime. Thus, identity of language, of custom, and of material culture constitutes another principle of differentiation, integrating each component part, and distinguishing it from the other.

We see, thus, that the actual concrete organization of human activities does not follow slavishly or exclusively the functional principles of type activities. This refers more specifically to primitive groups. As civilization develops, we find that law, education, and

economics tend more and more to become separated from such forms of organization as the family, the village, or the age-grade. They become institutionalized and bring into being specialized professions, spatially set off, with constructions such as factories, courts, and schools. But even in more primitive groups we find that certain occupations each tend to become incorporated into a definite organization. Such groups as magicians, shamans, potters, blacksmiths, or herdsman fall into natural teams, receiving, at least on certain occasions, a spatial unity—that is, specific rights to portions of the territory and to a material outfit that they have to wield under a differential charter of rules and traditional prerogatives. On occasions they work and act together and in separation from the rest of the community.

The analysis into aspects and the analysis into institutions must be carried out simultaneously, if we want to understand any culture completely. The study of such aspects as economics, education, or social control and political organization defines the type and level of the characteristic activities in a culture. From the point of view of the individual, the study of these aspects discloses to us the totality of motives, interests, and values. From the point of view of the group it gives us an insight into the whole process by which the individual is conditioned or culturally formed and of the group mechanism of this process.

The analysis into institutions, on the other hand, is indispensable because they give us the concrete picture of the social organization within the culture. In each institution the individual obviously has to become cognizant of its charter; he has to learn how to wield the technical apparatus or that part of it with which his activities associate him; he has to develop the social attitudes and personal sentiments in which the bonds of organization consist.

Thus, in either of these analyses the twofold approach through the study of the individual with his innate tendencies and their cultural transformation, and the study of the group as the relationship and co-ordination of individuals, with reference to space, environment, and material equipment, is necessary.

V. THE CULTURAL DEFINITION OF SYMBOLISM

One more addition, however, we shall have to make to our analysis. Right through our arguments we have implied the transmission of rules, the development of general principles of conduct and of technique, and the existence of traditional systems of value and sentiment. This brings us to one more component of human culture, symbolism, of which language is the prototype. Symbolism must make its appearance with the earliest appearance of human culture. It is in essence that modification of the human organism which allows it to transform the physiological drive into a cultural value.

Were we to start from the most tangible aspect of culture and try to imagine the first discovery and use of an implement we would see that this already implies the birth of symbolism. Any attempt to reconstruct concretely and substantially the beginnings of culture must remain futile. But we can analyze some of the cultural achievements of early man and see what each of them implies in its essence.

Imagine the transition from subhuman to human management of any environmental factor: the discovery of fire, the use of such a simple unfashioned implement as a stick or a stone. Obviously, the object thus used becomes an effective element in culture only when it is permanently incorporated into collective use, and the use is traditionally transmitted. Thus the recognition of the principle of its utility was necessary, and this principle had to be fixed so as to be communicable from one individual to another and handed on to the next generation. This alone means that culture could not originate without some element of social organization—that is, of permanent relations between individuals and a continuity of generations—for otherwise communication would not be possible. Co-operation was born in the actual carrying-out of any complex task, such as making fire and keeping it, and the use of fire for the preparation of food, but co-operation was even more necessary in the sharing and transmission even of the simplest principles of serviceability in production or use.

Incorporation and transmission implied one more element—the recognition of value. And it is here that we meet for the first time the mechanism of symbolization. The recognition of value means

that a deferred and indirect mechanism for the satisfaction of an urge becomes the object of emotional response. Whether we imagine that the earliest human beings communicated by elementary sounds or by gesture and facial expression, embodied and connected with manual and bodily activity, symbolism was born with the first deferred and indirect satisfaction of any and every bodily need.

The urges of hunger and sex, the desire for personal comfort and security were refocused and transferred onto an object or a process which was the indirect means to the end of satisfying a bodily need. This transference of physiological urge on the secondary reality was in its essence symbolic. Any of the signs, gestures, or sounds which led to the definition of an object, to the reproduction of a process, to the fixation of technique, utility, and value were in essence as fully symbolic as a Chinese pictogram or a letter in our alphabet. For symbolism from its very inception had to be precise, in the sense that it provided a correct formula for the permanent incorporation and transmission of the cultural achievement. It had to be effective in that the drive of the physiological need was transferred and permanently hitched upon the object, which adequately though indirectly subserved the satisfaction of this drive. The sign, sound, or material presentation, the cultural reality to which it referred, and the bodily desire which was indirectly satisfied through it became thus integrated into a unity through the process of conditioned reflex and conditioned stimulus which has become the basis of our understanding of habit, custom, and language through the researches of Pavlov and Bechterev.

This analysis proves again that the most important and elementary process—the creation of cultural symbolism and values—cannot be understood without direct reference to individual psychology and physiology. The formation of habits, skills, values, and symbols consists essentially in the conditioning of the human organism to responses which are determined not by nature but by culture.

On the other hand, the social setting is indispensable, because it is the group which maintains and transmits the elements of symbolism, and it is the group which trains each individual and develops in him the knowledge of technique, the understanding of symbols, and the appreciation of values. We have seen also that organization

—that is, the personal bonds which relate the members of a group—are based on the psychology and physiology of the individual, because they consist in emotional responses, in the appreciation of mutual services, and in the apprenticeship to the performance of specific tasks by each man within the setting of his group.

VI. THE INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND GROUP ACTIVITIES IN KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF

The understanding of the symbolic process allows us to consider another class of necessities imposed upon man by culture. Obviously, the member of any group has to be able to communicate with his fellow-beings. But this communication is never, not even in the highly differentiated groups of today, a matter of detached, abstract transmission of thought. In primitive communities, language is used even more exclusively for pragmatic purposes. Early human beings used language and symbolism primarily as a means of co-ordinating action or of standardizing techniques and imparting prescriptions for industrial, social, and ritual behavior.

Let us look more closely at some of these systems. To every type of standardized technique there corresponds a system of knowledge embodied in principles, which can be imparted to those who learn, and which help to co-operate those who are already trained. Principles of human knowledge based on true experience and on logical reasoning, and embodied in verbal statements, exist even among the lowest primitives. The view that primitive man has no rudiments of science, that he lives in a world of mystical or magical ideas, is not correct. No culture, however simple, could survive unless its techniques and devices, its weapons and economic pursuits, were based on the sound appreciation of experience and on a logical formulation of its principles. The very first human beings who discovered and incorporated fire-making as a useful art had to appreciate and define the material to be used, its conditions, as well as the technique of friction and of fanning the spark in the tinder. The making of stone implements, and even the selection of useful stones, implied a body of descriptive rules which had to be communicated from one person to another, both in co-operation and in transmission from those who had the experience to those who had to acquire it. Thus we can list

in Column E of our chart the necessity of general symbolic principles, which are embodied as a rule not merely in verbal statements but in verbal statements associated with the actual demonstration of technique and material, of physical context, and of utility and value (Col. E, "Transmission of experience by means of precise, consistent principles"). Thus knowledge, or a body of abstract symbols and verbal principles containing the capacity to appear as empirical fact and sound reasoning, is an implication of all cultural behavior even in its earliest beginnings.

In Column F we thus list knowledge as one of the systems of symbolic integration. By knowledge we mean the whole body of experience and of principle embodied in language and action, in techniques and organized pursuits—in food-gathering, with all it implies of natural history, in agriculture, hunting and fishing, sailing and trekking. Knowledge also implies, at every stage of development, the familiarity with the rules of co-operation and with all social obligations and privileges.

But once we realize that even the most primitive human beings developed systems of thought—that is, of foresight, of calculation, and of systematic planning—we are led to another psychological necessity connected with the cultural satisfaction of primary needs. The use of knowledge not only shows man how to achieve certain ends, it also reveals to him the fundamental uncertainties and limitations of his existence. The very fact that man, however primitive, has to think clearly, has to look ahead and also remember the successes and failures of his past experience makes him realize that not every problem can be solved, not every desire satisfied, by his own efforts.

From the point of view of individual psychology we see that reasonable processes and emotional reactions intertwine. The very calculations, and the fact that the principles of knowledge have to be built up into systems of thought, subject man to fear as well as to hope. He knows that his desire is often thwarted and that his expectations are subject to chance.

It is enough to remember that all human beings are affected by ill-health and have to face death ultimately, that misfortune and natural catastrophes, and elements disturbing the favorable run of

food-providing activities, always loom on man's mental horizon. The occurrence of such acts of destiny engender not merely reflection, thought, and emotional responses; they force the human group to take action. Plans have to be reorganized whenever a natural catastrophe occurs. The group becomes disintegrated by the death of one of its members, especially if he is a leading individual. Calamity or misfortune thus affects the individual personally, even as it disorganizes the group.

Which is the new, highly derived, yet emotionally founded need or imperative which these considerations entail? We see that acting as he always does within an atmosphere of uncertainty, with his hopes raised and fears or anxieties aroused, man needs certain positive affirmations of stability, success, and continuity. The dogmatic affirmations of religion and magic satisfy these needs. Whether we take such early beliefs as totemism, magic, or ancestor worship; or these beliefs more fully developed into the concept of providence, a pantheon of gods, or one divinity; we see that man affirms his convictions that death is not real nor yet final, that man is endowed with a personality which persists even after death, and that there are forces in the environment which can be tuned up and propitiated to the trend of human hopes and desires.

We can thus realize the dogmatic essence of religion by the analysis of individual mental processes. But here also the group enters immediately and no purely physiological or psychological analysis of the human organism is sufficient. In the first place, the reaction of man to death and disaster cannot be understood merely in terms of his concern with himself. It is the care for those who depend on him, and the sorrow for those to whom he was attached and who disappear, that provide as much inspiration to religious belief as does the self-centered concern for his own welfare.

Religion, however, does not end or even begin with dogmatic affirmations. It is a system of organized activities, in ritual as well as in ethics. Belief at no stage, certainly not the primitive levels, is a mere metaphysical system. It is a mode of ritual activity which allows man, whether by constraint or persuasion, to manage the supernatural world brought into being by his desires, hopes, fears, and anticipations. All ritual behavior, whether at burial and mourning,

at commemorative ceremony and sacrifice, or even in a magical performance, is social. It is social in the sense that often men and women pray, worship, and chant their magic formula in common. Even when a magical act is performed in solitude and secrecy, it invariably has social consequences. Ritual is also social in the sense that the end to be obtained, the integration of the group after death the conjuring-up of rain and fertility, of a rich haul in fishing, and hunting, or of a successful sailing expedition, concerns the interests not of a single person but of a group.

Even sorcery and black magic conform with the stipulations of our argument. In the first place, sorcery, though carried out in secret, produces powerful though negative social results. Again, sorcery is in correct functional interpretation, a primitive type of explaining and accounting for ill-health and death. The whole system of magical counteraction and cure, which is a regular counterpart of the belief in black magic, is the manner in which primitive man satisfies his individual cravings for some means of controlling a really uncontrollable evil. Sociologically it brings about the mobilization of the group consisting of the kinsmen, friends, and followers of the victim. Thus sorcery and the magical means of combating it again satisfy certain psychological needs and are accompanied by a sociological byplay of collective effort to deal with the disaster.

In all this we see once more that a parallel consideration of individual and organized group is indispensable in order to give us insight into the foundations, as well as the forms, of magic and religion. The structure of these cultural realities entails dogmatic thought—that is, positive affirmations about the existence of good and evil, of benevolent and hostile forces, residing in the environment and capable of influencing some of its responses. Such dogmatic affirmations contain recipes as to how the supernatural forces can be controlled through incantation and prayer, through ritual, sacrifice, and collective or individual sacrament.

Since religion consists by and large of collective efforts to achieve ends beneficent to one and all, we find that every religious system has also its ethical factors. Even in a magical ceremony, performed for a successful war or sailing expedition, for the counteracting of sorcery, or for the fertility of the fields, every participating individ-

ual and the leader of the performance is carrying out a task in which he subordinates his personal interest to the communal welfare. Such ceremonies carry with them also taboos and restrictions, duties and obligations. The ethics of a magical system consist in all these rules and restrictions to which the individual has to submit in the interests of the group.

The duties of mourning and burial, of communal sacrifice to ancestor ghosts or to totemic beings, also entail a number of rules, regulations, and principles of conduct which constitute the ethical aspect of such a ritual act. The structure of religion, therefore, consists in a dogmatic system of affirmations, in the technique of ritual, and in the rules and precepts of elementary ethics, which define the subordination of the individual to group welfare.

If we had time more fully to analyze the source of tribal rhythm, of emotional and bodily recreation, as well as their cultural satisfaction in artistic creation, in sports, games, and tribal ceremonial, we would find also that the need for any such cultural activity can only be understood by reference to individual psychology and to the needs of the individual organism. The type of satisfaction for each special need, however, implies immediately the elements of tradition, organization, and material equipment—that is, elements which cannot be discussed, still less understood, without the analysis of group life and group organization.

The gist of the foregoing argument has been condensed in our chart by the entry “Means of intellectual, emotional, and pragmatic control of destiny and chance” (Col. E), and in the corresponding entry of “Magic and religion” (Col. F). Again, the need for a “Communal rhythm of recreation, exercise, and rest” (Col. E) is satisfied by such cultural responses as “Art, sports, games, ceremonial” (Col. F).

VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This brief outline of the functional approach to anthropological field work and comparative theory of culture shows that at every step we had to study, in a parallel and co-ordinated manner, the individual and the group, as well as their relations. The understanding of both these entities, however, must be supplemented by including

the reality of environment and material culture. The problem of the relation between group and individual is so pervading and ubiquitous that it cannot be treated detached from any question of culture and of social or psychological process. A theory which does not present and include at every step the definitions of individual contributions and of their integration into collective action stands condemned. The fact that functionalism implies this problem constantly and consistently may be taken as a proof that, so far as it does, it does not neglect one of the most essential problems of all social science.

Indeed, functionalism is, in its essence, the theory of transformation of organic—that is, individual—needs into derived cultural necessities and imperatives. Society by the collective wielding of the conditioning apparatus molds the individual into a cultural personality. The individual, with his physiological needs and psychological processes, is the ultimate source and aim of all tradition, activities, and organized behavior.

The word “society” is used here in the sense of a co-ordinated set of differentiated groups. The juxtaposition and opposition of “the individual” and “the society,” as an indifferentiated mass, is always fictitious and therefore fallacious.

From the structural approach we have found that social organization must always be analyzed into institutions—that is, definite groups of men united by a charter, following rules of conduct, operating together a shaped portion of the environment, and working for the satisfaction of definite needs. This latter defines the function of an institution.

Here, once more, we see that every institution contributes, on the one hand, toward the integral working of the community as a whole, but it also satisfies the derived and basic needs of the individual. Thus the family is indispensable to society in supplying its members, training them, and safeguarding their early stages. At the same time to consider the role of the family without reference to individuals in their sex drive, in their personal affections, as between husband and wife, parents and children, or to study the early stages of life-history of the individual outside the domestic circle would be absurd. The local group, as the organization for the joint use of an apportioned territory, as the means of collective defense, and as the medium for

the primary division of labor, works as a part of society and as one of its indispensable organs. At the same time, every one of the benefits just listed is enjoyed by every individual member. His role and membership in that group have to be stated from the point of view of psychology, education, and also of the physiological benefits derived by each from the joint activities. The tribe and state carries out a collective policy in war and peace, in conquest and intertribal or international trade; but the very existence of tribe or state depends on the quality of citizenship, which is an individual fact and which consists in the contributions toward, and the benefits derived from, the participation of the individual in group life.

Were we to consider such institutionalized activities as those dependent on age, which are organized into primitive age-grades or the age hierarchies of our civil service, military organization, or professional work, we would find again that the problem must be stated in terms both of individual life-history and of age as a principle of social differentiation and integration.

In the genetic approach, the functionalist demands that, in field work and theory alike, the formation of such collective aptitudes and formed dispositions as taste, skill, principle, dogma, and value be stated in terms of both individual and group. No mental attitude or bodily skill can be understood without reference both to the innate individual and organic endowment and to the cultural influences by which it is shaped.

We have, in this article, followed the gradual transformation of biological needs into cultural imperatives and satisfactions. We have seen that, starting from the individual organism and its requirements, and studying the cultural satisfaction thereof, we come upon instrumental and integrative imperatives. In every culture there corresponds to these such types of organized activities as economics, education, political organization, and legal system; and again organized religion and magic, as well as artistic and recreational activities.

If space would allow we could show that, since every one of these integrative pursuits is carried on by a group, whether this be family, clan, or congregation; since dogma, mythology, and sacred history provide its charters; since every ritual implies a liturgical apparatus;

and since the activities are integrated around a definite purpose or function, the communion with the supernatural—we would find that the integrative aspects of culture are again carried on in institutions, religious, magical, artistic, ceremonial, and recreational. The church, the congregation, the totemic clan, the magical or shamanistic corporations, as well as sporting teams and organizations of musicians, dancers, and actors, are examples of such institutions.

The individual, both in social theory and in the reality of cultural life, is the starting-point and the end. The very beginning of human civilization consists in acts of rudimentary mastery of implements, of production of goods, and of the incorporation of special achievements into a permanent tradition by means of symbolism. Society and its component groups are the carriers of verbal—that is, symbolic—tradition, the guardians of communal wealth, and the joint operators of the material and spiritual achievements of a culture. But in all this the ultimate modifying power, the creative inspiration, and all impulse and invention come from the individual.

Culture remains sound and capable of further development only in so far as a definite balance between individual interest and social control can be maintained. If this balance be upset or wrongly poised, we have at one end anarchy, and at the other brutal dictatorship. The present world is threatened in its various parts and through different agencies both with anarchy and with the brutal oppression in which the interests of the state, managed by small gangs with dictatorial powers, are made completely to overrule the elementary rights and interests of the individual. The theoretical discussion of the relation between the individual and the group has thus in our present world not merely an academic but also a deep philosophical and ethical significance. It cannot be too often repeated that any culture which kills individual initiative, and relegates the interests of most of its members to complete insignificance at the expense of a gang-managed totalitarian state, will not be able to develop or even to preserve its cultural patrimony.

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